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Let's talk Neuroscience


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This is a tidbit of the video linked here.

 

I'm going to post any stuff I find on my interest(s) in the workings of the brain here.

 

I like this vid for several reasons.

 

I am of the agreeing opinion that consciousness is basically just a phenomena of a highly developed problem-solving organ, the result of evolution's greatest and most terrible creation; the human being.

 

The idea that underlying thought processes (mostly from our evolutionary past) have an effect on our conscious patterns doesn't surprise me. It's something I've figured was there for a long time. The dilated eyes in women thing being a sign of sexual readiness, where the conscious mind isn't aware of this but it's programmed into us biologically being a perfect example.

 

It has a wide-range of implications and cases. Like how we find babies cute, it's an evolutionary trait as Daniel Dennis put it. If we didn't find babies cute, we probably wouldn't be do driven to take care of them, and would be repulsed by all the drool, waste matter, and regurgitated food. But we don't, we find them adorable (generally, there are obviously people who don't like babies, I being one of them, atleast for real little ones), and we are some of the most attached parents in the animal kingdom. Which also probably has alot to do with our long development period, which is also integrally linked to our cognitive development.

 

I think David Eagleman has a good point in saying we need to take a look at the brain as not one in sync organ, but a collage of various parts that manage to work together. I think evolution can help this along as well, because for me atleast, it seems only sensible.

 

Our brain evolved, so it might be worth while to think about the brain and the parts thereof and how/why they evolved. The functions they serve, and the behavioral impact of all those things.

 

Just my 2 cents, you should watch the vid though; I'll post more, probably.

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  • 1 year later...

You know, I don’t know too much about the guy in all honestly aside from what I have seen from him in videos. I don't subscribe to OOR, or any of these neuroscientific theories as far as an explanation of phenomenal experience goes. This much you already know. If think it is an interesting argument for the neuronal correlate to consciousness though, which is entirely different.

 

OOR is based on Roger Penrose's theories, a physicist who can't be said to be a quack. He wrote the emperor’s new mind (a book I own btw) and is at Oxford.

 

In any event what we are really talking about isn't an explanation of consciousness. What does it even mean to say that consciousness, and ultimately all phenomenal properties are the same as

 

a wave function collapse? Sounds like a panpsychism in disguise.

 

I think the model is interesting though insofar as it attempts to get around the, we’ll say, so far (to be generous), insurmountable hurdle materialism faces in overcoming its ontological shortcomings in the domain of theory of mind. Neuroscience should stick to what it does best, being a science, explain predictively, what we should expect, and leave the ontology out of it.

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Except a lot of what Penrose writes on the matter is considered hot garbage by legit theoretical physicists.

 

The whole "problem" of ontological shortcomings in materialism comes from the expectation for things to work in the way we think they work. Most learned physicists and such, know that we don't know how it works yet; we only know a little bit about not a whole lot, and even that is constantly changing.

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Except a lot of what Penrose writes on the matter is considered hot garbage by legit theoretical physicists.

 

Well, not to my knowledge, but then again I am not a big Penrose guy either so I would debate you on his merits. I have his book but haven't looked into him any further than that. I'm just not so sure if your dismissal of him is warrented but w/e.

 

In any event, its not about him as it is about his theory. A monkey could propose the next best physics there, and it would have no barring on the theories accuracy would it?

 

 

The whole "problem" of ontological shortcomings in materialism comes from the expectation for things to work in the way we think they work. Most learned physicists and such, know that we don't know how it works yet; we only know a little bit about not a whole lot, and even that is constantly changing.

 

I definitely agree with you that explanations are changing constantly in science. But,

 

It's not really a matter of ignorance in some way of "how it works." As you said, we know in science that we know very little of how things "work." But how things work and what things are, are very different, and they are not the same at all. To say it another way, you can talk about what how something happens, without talking about what than something is, in the onoltogical sense.

 

Science is very, very good, and probably the best method we have, of figuring out what are the regularities (if there be any ultimately) within our interactive field of experience. Notice how I don't commit myself to any subjective-object dualism there. Finding the regularities is great, and we find those regularities via the predictive value of theoretical models. The models are merely tools to get us those predictive regularities and act as a logical context to give us a coherent framework that we can work off of, that we call "explanation." But here "explanation" necessarily means, that logical tool which gives us a basis for predictive regularities within the field of our experience.

 

There is nothing in that commits us ever to an ontology. It really doesn't even matter if you think things are fundamentally made of "ehdebdnednq" whatever that means. It’s just a place-holder for your model's predictive value. Basically, we can have our models without any ontology because science doesn't depend, commit to, or have anything to do with, ontology.

 

Look at OOR for a sec. Now I know you don't buy that model, but it's ok cause I don't either. The theory purports to explain consciousness as being a wave function collapse, orchestrated in the cytoskeliton of cells, or something like that right? The quantum computation that this structure gives rise to, when coupled with the entire structure of the brain and nervous system as a whole, gives rise to the complex consciousness we experience.

 

But notice, how he uses OOR gets around the hard problem. You see, what makes his theory any diferent than any other theory in terms of the hard problem? Sure he is taking the consciousness issue down to a more "fundimental level" but that the hard problem can be applied at any level really, because it's not about levels. Hameroff says in that lecture that at the subatomic level (or maybe Plank level, I forget) there is consciousness or "proto-consciousness." That's how he get's around the problem. Then he goes on to explain how the combination of all these structures, which have proto-consciousness, do what they do. Notice the workings, that is the real meat and potatoes of OOR don't solve the hard problem anymore than any other current theory does. It just takes things down a level. He get's around the problem by slipping in a form of pan psychism. So conscious or proto-conscious properties exist at some level of matter. Notice both "matter" and these "conscious properties," are, in the context of the hard problem, ontological assertions, that really function independently of the predictive regularities of the theory.

 

What OOR is actually doing, is introducing a set of ontological assumptions to avoid the hard problem; first that there exists a stuff called matter which is some sort of objective substance, but also adding that there are these phenomenal properties as well being somehow part of matter. So he has a 3d objective ontological structure and the beginings of a phenomenal ontology all in one. That's panschychism, or maybe property dualism, either way its onotology. The complex description of cytoskelitons and quantum computation is all nice, but the real "explanation" of consciousness is really just to give a seprate phenomenological account, which is claimed to exist at the most fundimental level of matter (whatever that is).

 

we can just strip the ontological assumptions away, and we will still have OOR as a theory in terms of a correlate to consciousness, and have our predictive regularities without any need or talk of ontology.

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One of my problems is people willing to jump the gun on things of this nature. Because there's so much unknown, they simply take the liberty of using that to make wild assumptions claiming their "theory" patches great amounts of those unknown(s), almost without failure never doing a single bit of that.

 

There's good reasons why science is so demanding. Our understanding of the standard model, quantum mechanics, etc.. etc.. are growing; perhaps slowly, but it has to be done with the utmost vigilance and the least most assumption. Science operates on what is known, and assumes as little as possible for a reason; it works. Not only methadologically, but systemically.

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One of my problems is people willing to jump the gun on things of this nature. Because there's so much unknown, they simply take the liberty of using that to make wild assumptions claiming their "theory" patches great amounts of those unknown(s), almost without failure never doing a single bit of that.

 

Yeah, I'm with you that we shouldn't jump the gun. The way I look at it myself is, like, for exmaple, "where is your inference?" So many times people make these wild leaps that aren't logical.

 

There's good reasons why science is so demanding. Our understanding of the standard model, quantum mechanics, etc.. etc.. are growing; perhaps slowly, but it has to be done with the utmost vigilance and the least most assumption. Science operates on what is known, and assumes as little as possible for a reason; it works. Not only methadologically, but systemically.

 

Definitely, we should strip away any assumptions or unnecessary postulates. I also agree it must proceed systematically according to its method, and this process can be slow going, but it is a necessary evil, if you will.

 

However, what kind of method is it and what sorts of conclusions is it capable of drawing categorically in principle? See, there is the rub. I agree with you on the bit about time and surely being open to the unknown, but I think you confuse the fact of the "unknown" in the domain within our scientific knowledge to mean that the scientific method has no epistemological limits.

 

If I remember I thought your response is something to the effect of, "how do we know we can't find a scientific solution to such and such a problem." My answer here is that the limits of science are not set by the fact of our scientific knowledge being incomplete, but by the catagorical limitations assumed by the method from the get-go. Its like if I was an investigator and I am only limited to looking at a certain brand of evidence and only allowed to use certain sorts of methods, then there may be information that may be beyond my methods of investigation.

 

See, just like you said that we shouldn't take theories that seem to patch unknowns at the local level of explanation, I am saying we shouldn't take methods as a whole, as patching epistemological unknowns at the meta-level of method itself.

 

That's why I don't think we will ever have a solution to the hard problem of consciousness that could ever be considered "scientific" and ultimately why all ontological disputes will never be addressed by science either. As far as consciousness goes, science will never be phenomenology, and phenomenology will never be science. Likewise for ontology or metaphysics generally.

 

One of the biggest proof of this is that we really can do science without any talk of ontology in any real sense. Not to beat a dead horse or anything, but suppose we really do live in some sort of virtual reality simulation as some people think (I'm not one of them btw), then we could still do science just the same exact way we are doing now and it would make no diference. That's because the kind of knowledge the method is getting us to is about regularities that we can predict as part of a logical framework (the thoeries themselves which are nothing but tools for predictive value), and nothing more.

 

I know it might sound like I'm trying to bash science, but believe me I'm not. I just think its important to recognise the limits of the method.

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We don't know the limits of scientific knowledge.

 

But that's just an assertion. On what basis is it that we don't know those limits? Didn't I gave you an idea of where those limits could be found, namely in "the categorical limitations assumed in the method?" I really think you might be confusing the limits of ascertaining knowledge within the scope of the scientific method with the limits of the method itself.

 

What sets the many worlds hypothesis as a scientific notion is if it can be investigated empirically to have predictive value. If it cannot, it is not science. That's a limit of the method. The limit is in the very criteria used in the method. it's just like I said before with the analogy of an investigator.

 

Inquiry outside of science simply doesn't have the credentials that science has, not in the slightest.

 

Sounds to me like your just begging the question, but maybe I'm mistaken. Care to elaborate on what credentials would that be? Social acceptance perhaps? That's culturally relative and historically contextual, hence contingent. Pragmatic value maybe? Well I would say that it does have practical value. Thanks to science I can turn my car on. It's useful, but so are allot of things. It is useful I would add because it has predictive value. But if we were really in some VR simulation it would have the same predictive value and it would be indistinguishable from a real world, whatever that would mean. At the end of the day science is useful in predicting outcomes with conceptual tools we call theories. I'm just saying lets be truthful about the limits it has. You disagree I'm sure, but on what basis?

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You just stated very good reasons for why my assertion that "we don't know the limits of scientific knowledge" is correct. We don't understand anywhere near enough to even grasp the concept of such a question, so how can we claim things are beyond the reach of the best system of deduction or "knowledge gathering" we have? There's certainly plenty of things that are outside the scope of scientific inquiry, such as subjective questions like "what is happiness" (granted biology can answer that in a mechanical way by what we know of the neurology of happiness, but as far as a conscious state and what derives it, there's little objective "Truth" to be had).

 

What I mean is most systems of inquiry that are not scientific, are bogus, that's why we've abandoned them. Nobody is looking for alchemists and sages to crack how we might deal with nuclear waste material, we ask physicists, chemists, etc..

 

Predictive value in a VR vs. Real World scenario are still slaves to pragmatism, so it doesn't really matter.

 

I'm perfectly fine with accepting it has limits, but I just don't know what those limits are.

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You just stated very good reasons for why my assertion that "we don't know the limits of scientific knowledge" is correct. We don't understand anywhere near enough to even grasp the concept of such a question, so how can we claim things are beyond the reach of the best system of deduction or "knowledge gathering" we have?

 

Maybe we are speaking past each other to some extent, due to some ambiguity on this issue, or maybe I just don't understand what you mean here. I thought I gave reasons for why we do know the limits of the scientific method and why we do understand that question.

 

 

 

There's certainly plenty of things that are outside the scope of scientific inquiry, such as subjective questions like "what is happiness" (granted biology can answer that in a mechanical way by what we know of the neurology of happiness, but as far as a conscious state and what derives it, there's little objective "Truth" to be had).

 

Ok. Well that is because we cannot know what something is appart from what it is like. Ontology is necssarily as a starting point, phenomenological. The question is, is can we know that there are things appart from what they are like? If we can or cannot, we wont be able to answer that with science, ever.

 

What I mean is most systems of inquiry that are not scientific, are bogus, that's why we've abandoned them. Nobody is looking for alchemists and sages to crack how we might deal with nuclear waste material, we ask physicists, chemists, etc..

 

Bogus because they are inherently illogical, they weren't systematic or because they lacked predictive value? What is your standard of judgement here, utility or social convention, or both or something else?

 

 

 

Predictive value in a VR vs. Real World scenario are still slaves to pragmatism, so it doesn't really matter.

 

So then ontology is irrelevant to scientific inquiry. But then any ontologies like materialism and the rest cannot have any scientific basis. Also that means that science cannot, ever, in principle, solve the hard problem of consciousness given that it rests on ontological assumptions.

 

Also, we are only "slaves" to pragmatism if we exclusively except scientific methodology as being the only way to obtain ALL forms of knowledge. There is no reason to do that and even trying to make such an assertion is inhernetly contradictory due to the logical, mathamatical and epistemological assumptions assumed in the scientific method itself.

 

I think you make a false dicotomy between science on the one hand, and things like alchemy and sosory or w/e.

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Bogus because they are inherently illogical, they weren't systematic or because they lacked predictive value? What is your standard of judgement here, utility or social convention, or both or something else.

 

Bogus in that they do not have the predictive or pragmatic utility that science has, nor does it have novel convention on knowledge. There have been a plethora of things throughout the 20th and now budding 21st Century that were long held as "outside" the grasp of science, and now have been brought into the fold. Like "why is the sky blue?" (Oxygen's nature with regards to light, I guess Nitrogen's too). Why does a painting inspire us? (

) and we're only scratching the surface (suffice to our knowledge that's all we'll be doing for a good while, and that's exciting).

 

It doesn't mean that other things are not without their own value, but as far as figuring out where we stand, science is our greatest tool, so far.

 

So then ontology is irrelevant to scientific inquiry. But then any ontologies like materialism and the rest cannot have any scientific basis. Also that means that science cannot, ever, in principle, solve the hard problem of consciousness given that it rests on ontological assumptions.

 

Also, we are only "slaves" to pragmatism if we exclusively except scientific methodology as being the only way to obtain ALL forms of knowledge. There is no reason to do that and even trying to make such an assertion is inhernetly contradictory due to the logical, mathamatical and epistemological assumptions assumed in the scientific method itself.

 

I think you make a false dicotomy between science on the one hand, and things like alchemy and sosory or w/e.

 

You assume it can't answer the hard problem of consciousness, because you have set forth this ridiculous set of parameters that philosophers have devised in a centuries old series of thought experiments. Can you even define what sort of answer you're looking for? Because science basically has one, that consciousness is a trick (to put it briefly), an evolutionary marvel and an aspect of the human brain state. Granted you'll doubt the validity of such things, because you're consumed with possibilities that have no foundational establishment. Sure, I guess you could say science operates on the assumption that the material world we live in, is real. But that assumption is beyond useful, has produced prodigious benefits, and has nothing to doubt it but creative doubt.

 

I mean what ontological basis is there for materialism in science? There's simply the lack of anything else having any standing. Suffice to our operating knowledge, material "is" and it doesn't need a non-material explanation (granted quantum physics by old-school definition is kinda non-material, but it falls within the wherewithal of capital M "Materialism").

 

Science doesn't deny other possible options, if you think so, simply take a look at some of the theoretical ideas in the realm of M-Theory, Multiverses. etc.. etc..

 

You make this argument that if we're in a "simulation" reality than things lose meaning/purpose or whatever. But they don't, that's the grand argument of pragmatism. If we are in a "simulation" world, then science is still pragmatic because it's quite obvious we're limited to this "simulation" (it's our world if we're living in it), and it has rules we can learn and use to our advantage. That's why Rorty was saying capital "P" Philosophy is dead.

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Bogus in that they do not have the predictive or pragmatic utility that science has, nor does it have novel convention on knowledge. There have been a plethora of things throughout the 20th and now budding 21st Century that were long held as "outside" the grasp of science, and now have been brought into the fold. Like "why is the sky blue?" (Oxygen's nature with regards to light, I guess Nitrogen's too). Why does a painting inspire us? (

) and we're only scratching the surface (suffice to our knowledge that's all we'll be doing for a good while, and that's exciting).

 

It doesn't mean that other things are not without their own value, but as far as figuring out where we stand, science is our greatest tool, so far.

 

Ok, I think I can roll with this.

 

 

You assume it can't answer the hard problem of consciousness, because you have set forth this ridiculous set of parameters that philosophers have devised in a centuries old series of thought experiments.

 

Actually, things like phenomenology aren't centuries old. They aren't even a century old. and there are lots of developments in philosophy that you just don't see. For instance there are very serious people doing metaphysics in analytic circles, about all sorts of things like causation, wholes vs. parts, paradoxes, etc.

 

But I don't see why age has any sort of barring on truth or logic. Math, for instance, has been around for a long time and while our knowledge of it has grown, there are still things that are true through and through.

 

And as for the hard problem,where did I assume anything? I'm working off of the basic concepts assumed by the problem to begin with. I'm just pointing out that it leads to an absurdity, which means the assumptions of the problem itself are wrong. That's the opposite of what your saying I'm saying.

 

 

Can you even define what sort of answer you're looking for? Because science basically has one, that consciousness is a trick (to put it briefly), an evolutionary marvel and an aspect of the human brain state. Granted you'll doubt the validity of such things, because you're consumed with possibilities that have no foundational establishment.

 

When you say its a trick, you sound like a line right out of Consciousness explained or perhaps Dennitte's TED talk. What your talking about is a Dennitian take on consciousness, which is philosophical, and it surely isn't the only one. Dennitte is a philosopher of science, but the thing about him is that he disregards experience altogather. He is free to make that case, but he can't make it with science. That's a philosophical argument. and I know this cor certain because its simply a consequence of the meanings fo the words involved here.

 

 

 

Sure, I guess you could say science operates on the assumption that the material world we live in, is real. But that assumption is beyond useful, has produced prodigious benefits, and has nothing to doubt it but creative doubt.

 

I'm saying science in the strict sense doesn't opporate on that assumption (materialism). It doesn't need it, and in fact, that "assumption" isn't even scientific, its philosophical. As far as pragmatic value goes, you can make all the sorts predictions with a model, but don't confuse the predictive value of concepts for ontological reality. It's not the same, and we don't need ontology to do science, hence we don't need materialism as thought of being an ontological reality. Therefore materialism, as an ontological reality, literally isn't usefull at all scientfically, although it might seem that way. The concept has historically proven usefull technologically, but that says nothing about its ontological validity.

 

 

I mean what ontological basis is there for materialism in science? There's simply the lack of anything else having any standing. Suffice to our operating knowledge, material "is" and it doesn't need a non-material explanation (granted quantum physics by old-school definition is kinda non-material, but it falls within the wherewithal of capital M "Materialism").

 

I disgaree. There is no basis for it at all. You can't emperically verify it and you can't falsify it. That exhausts all the criteria for a scientific endevor.

 

Science doesn't deny other possible options, if you think so, simply take a look at some of the theoretical ideas in the realm of M-Theory, Multiverses. etc.. etc..

 

Sure, but science isn't telling us anything ontologically relevant about reality, unless someone's specific ontology makes emperical prediction. Things could be falsified in that case, but ontology is to general for that, and materialism is on that level of generality.

 

You make this argument that if we're in a "simulation" reality than things lose meaning/purpose or whatever. But they don't, that's the grand argument of pragmatism. If we are in a "simulation" world, then science is still pragmatic because it's quite obvious we're limited to this "simulation" (it's our world if we're living in it), and it has rules we can learn and use to our advantage. That's why Rorty was saying capital "P" Philosophy is dead.

 

I'm confused here as to why you would say that the implications of the simulation argument or one like it would mean that life would lose any meaning or purpose. I'm not syaing that at all. This whole buisness about pragmatism as opposed to a classical idea of truth really only arises when you take certain philosophical assumptions, something someone like Rorty would hardly object too.

 

The part where you mention "rules that are to our advantage" is exactly what I am getting at. But don't confuse that which is usefull and advantagous with an accurate picture of reality "out there" above and beyond the phenomenological. That is where the disconect is. Materialism, in any of its flavors, commits that falacy.

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Ok, I think I see your thought process now.

 

One preliminary remark about the simulation argument before I respond to what you said. It's not that we might be in a simulation or the "real" world, because there could be other possibilities. In other words, that's not the only choice. But I harp on the simulation because its a simple example given our techno-friendly culture. Really the argument has to do with ontology, phenomenology and empirical epistemology, but talking about it in that way or more technical and not always necessary.

 

With that said,

 

To try to restate what your getting at; it is often assumed by some when they hear that sort of argument that we could be in a simulation, or in your words "its possible" that we might be in one, that there is no positive reason (well some physicists are starting to theories about it but without getting into that) for why should we take it seriously and not just assume the materialist hypothesis. That sounds to me basically what you’re saying in response.

 

My retort is that the implications of the argument don't allow for you to grant that there is any good reason whatsoever to think the world is a simulation, material, or any of the other choices out there in principle. It’s an argument from skepticism about those sorts of possibilities.

 

In other words, what it does is simply dethrone any objective epistemic foothold anyone thought they might have of the world, and brings you right back to the point of experience, or, what we might call the phenomenological. Anything beyond that, is not a task for science, because science cannot in principle ever answer that question (although it can help chip down some specific possibilities, at best). It's really a metaphysical problem, and a metaphysical problem only.

 

What it does is shift the burden of proof not only onto the simulation proponent, but onto the would-be materialist also, and whoever else wants to propose this or that theory.

 

 

 

This is what I think happens in a crude sort of way. We have an experience, which is just that, an experience in which subject and object are part of the same reality we call experience; this is the phenomenal. Sometimes we take elements of our experience like objects that we percieve and we imagine them in our mind (which is still yet another first person experience) and we asign a conception of reality as one that is outside of anything we experience, and funidmentally diferent in some way. That's how you get materialism, representationalism, redictionism, etc. Then we are faced with the insurmountable chalenge of trying to reconcile the two. It's just like with dualism, it doesn't work. The fatal error is in us taking the image we have in your heads of how we think world is really, for how the world is really, when we don't even have not one shred of proof is there be such a thing. At best its a conceptual tool to help us get along. But the funny thing is, you can make the same sort of predicts using models that are anti-materialistic but function the same (there is your pragmatism). in other words, materialism is actually all in your head, and not in your perception. The world you experience, is just an experience, primarilly. Materialism isn't a given nore does any pragmatic utility it might have at some historical time lend any support to its validity.

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I kinda think Raor is saying "fuck the metaphysical let's talk physical"

 

Right, I get that.

 

I'm making the point, that talking about the "physical" is actually talking metaphysically. You might not think it appears that way, but appearances can be deceiving.

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You just say it's metaphysical, you assume the metaphysical is a thing, and not just a concept.

 

I never assumed it was metaphysical, I have given reasons for why it is. Materialism is a metaphysical concept and it needs metaphysical justification if we are going to believe it to be true. Science can never prove it to be true, even in principle. I have given reasons for this.

 

Not sure I understand the last part of your sentence "not just a concept." What do you mean? Edit: rather can you elaborate more on what you mean by that?

Edited by exogen
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sure it does.

 

My statement means that I didn't assume that materialism as a rational theory of reality is metaphysical in terms of how to catagorise it. Here by "assume" I was talking about as in taking information to be true without suficent reason to endorse it. That's why I said "I gave reasons why it is," meaning, that I gave reasons already, in prior posts, as to why materialism is to be classified as a metaphysical concept, specifically an ontological one, given that it is a theory of being. I say "metaphysical here also, and was in context to how PD was using it as well, to mean that which is opposed to what we can experience with our five senses. Even materialists will tell you, the world we experience is a representation of the "real" world they claim exists. That is, we experience a virtual image of the world, not the world directly. This is a form of representationalism.

 

With that in mind, the last sentence is that if we are going to accept materialism as true, then it needs to be justified with "metaphysical" arguments. Here "metaphysical" is the branch of philosophy that deals with inquiry into reality. That study is not limited by the constraints of the scientific method, although it is obviously limited by logic. As I give reasons for above, science can't demonstrate that the world we experience is physical, hence if we are to believe that it is, the reason, will have to come from somewhere other than science.

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