exogen

What are the people at microsoft thinking when they make these controllers? "Let's just make a fat boomerang." Looking at the ps3 d-pad from this angle, maybe it wont be so bad. But isn't the d-pad smaller on the new one than it was on the privious shell?

yeah I want to train mine to roll over on command. Maybe with a little work mine will be able to sit without having to give him an AC biscuit.

Yeah I meant how it was one peace underneith. It looks like from that picture noob, that it is separated above again, but its so close togather. IDK i hope its good. Either way, Xbox will suck.

lol AC's rolling now. If only you could do that as an actual manuver. Noob, if you look at the in-deapth video 3 the fallen posted, at 2:12:00: the fight around that time I see damage racing in its prime. What do you think?

I don't like how they fused the D-pad directions togather into one cross. Its not as bad as Xbox's D pad, but I much prefered the individuated directions. I hope the controllers are more durable than PS3's though. I have been through like 6 controllers sinse PS3 launch.

Nob, don't facts have to be percieved to be "known?" I mean it seems you want to talk about "facts" as being thought of as independant of perception and conception. But while that might be the idea of it, you have no way to ever confirm that because any test or argument you could supply would be within experience, not outside of it. And if you can't confirm facts appart from perception and conception (and experience in general), how do you know there are any facts? that is, your distinction relies on "facts" as being appart from experience, which is why you contrast it with "truth" which is only perception and conception. But under your own definitions, isn't all you really have is "truth" and not facts?

In case you ever decide to act like an adult and unblock me Raor and enterian an argument that runs contrary to your own, here is my summary of the way I see things. 1. There is a difference between a scientific theory being supported by, or compatible with, empirical evidence (verifiablity) via the predictions of the theory, and that theory itself being falsifiable. I’m saying that materialism is empirically unfalsifiable. 2. You counter me by saying that at least currently, physical explanations work very well. The only thing you could mean by “work” in a scientific context is if those physical theories have predictive value. You point out, that they have predictive value of a high degree, and therefore we should not entertain anything else until we get something that predicts stuff better. Materialism works, so why switch right? 3. Empirically predictive value isn’t the same as ontological confirmation. 4. I’m saying that we could make those same predictions in VR. Let’s call it the VR hypothisis. A world that isn’t physical is indistinguishable from a world that is, experimentally speaking Hence materialism is unfalsifiable. It makes no difference if this is a thought experiment. The point is there is no way to scientifically test competing ontologies in this case, which makes materialism, along with the VR hypothisis, unfalsifable. 5. Falsifiablity is a criterion of science, therefore materialism doesn’t belong in it untill a way can be shown to falsify it. You will probably want to return me to “2” at this point. You think verifiability can determine ontology when it can’t. That’s why science also uses falsifiability as one of its criteria. So I return you to “3” and the rest. Or you might harp on "5" and claim that there might be some way to make materialism falsifable one day. i'm saying if we go deeper into this you will find that even in principle, you can't do that. But even if for the sake of arguments sake we granted that, it still means that right now, currently, materialism isn't scientific. In regards to "3" emperical verifiablity can never achieve ontological confirmation because the data can always be ontologically reinterpreted to fit that data. That's why falsifiablity is important in the scientific method. The problem with materialism is that alternative theories (like VR) can explain the same data with funtionally idential results - equivelant predictive value. In regards to the VR hypothisis itself it is really not so far fetched even for the materialist. The materialist is forced to recognise that consciousness and experience in general isn't the actual world one is interacting with but a simulation of it, a representation, generated in the brain (somehow). So the real world is never emperically confirmed. So why does it have to be a "real" world i.e. the brain and the rest of the so called physical matter, to do the simulation? Some more recent theories in physics are starting to talk about information, analogous to ones and zeros as being the fundimental unit of reality. Information itself can be described as being more fundimental that spacetime effectively rulling out materialism as a theory. "matter would be merely an emergent property of something more fundimental, be it information in this case or who knows what. So the VR hypothisis isn't even much a rational strech at this point, like you try to make it out to be. Even theories like Biocentricism, new as they might be, present rational alternatives to the standard materialist dogma. theories may be entrenched for a time, but as Thomas Khun noted in his book The Scientific Revolutions, theories go through paradigmatic shifts. The idea of VR matters for the falsifiablity criteria because VR is a consequence of materialism being true. If materialism is true, then our experience must be virtual. But then if our experience is virtual (we are stuck in virtual reality), how do we know that materialism is true in the first place? We could say it explains the VR i.e. our experience. But aside from saying that it fits the data we have no way to confirm it. It's not so much a problem of induction as it is a problem of the model itself being circular. It explains experience with what we can't experience, but when we say it "explains" experience all we mean here is that we have a set of ideas, or theories, that "fit" the data as being on possible explanation. but the nature of that explanation is such that it allows for alternatives. How would we test those? The implications for neuroscience and consciousness follow accordingly.

Actually it does. What it sounds like is your saying the reality we experience is more real, cause its right in our face, than other "Reality" (with a captial R) that we might be speculating about in our heads. I totally agree, and have been trying to make that point all along. I'm saying materialism is actually not in front of you in the sense that it is self-evident. And I'm saying that science can't ever demonstrate it to be true due to the method of science itself. I would go on to ague (although I haven;t done so here), that the "reality" that we experience is "Reality" with a capital R. The question is, what kind of ontological claims can we make about our experience, if any at all? I think the reality we experience is the reality, but I don't think there is reason to think it is a material reality at all, nore to I think science shows even one bit of evidence that it is. There is a diference in what is the case, that is, the Truth, and what we might believe or what could be the case for all we know. We can predict our experience, which inductively suggests that our experience follows some sort of regularity. I'm in agreement. But this bit about it being "physical," if what you mean by that is an ontological claim, cannot be established to be true to any degree of probablity no matter how accurate your predictions are. I have already explained why. For you to keep asserting it without dealing with my arguments is flawed. Maybe, or maybe you haven't adressed very subtle points about scientific epistemology. But what do you mean by "real" here? If by "real" you mean "physical" then your reasoning from the VR hypothisis is correct, because yes, it is possible that everything could be part of the simulation, including the mind itself. I don't dispute that, and I kind of was assuming you and I were on the same page in that regard as that being an implication, or one of the possiblities when we conciderthe VR hypothisis. You seem to want to lump me in with people that think that there is a physical reality, and also a non-physical one (dualism). I don't believe there is a physical or a non-physical one, because I think those distinctions are falacious. And a mechanistic explanation doesn't make me feel uncomfertable at all. If materialism turned out to be true (although science could never prove it) I wouldn't be swayed. I used to be a materialist to about 99% myself. We would be wrong to assume so. But materialism is actually one of those to add to the list of "for all we know possiblities." You just don't seem to see that because you confuse the emperically predictive value of concepts with ontology in fact. Science needs the latter, not the former. Materialism is an ontology and like any ontology it requires an epistemological justification to suffiently warrent belief. the VR "possiblity/argument" is really just a usefull intuition pump (to barrow D.C. Dennitt's term) to draw out concepts that we might not be focused on. What it demonstrates is that materialism is equally a possiblity along with other ontologies, like the VR hypothisis. The implication of that is that it points out that what science is doing is giving us predictions about the world we experience, and predictions only. But WHY those predictions work, is something you seem to mistake for the truth of the ontology that might be atrributed to the theory, but need not be. We can still have the scientific theory without making any ontological commitments (just like we could if we knew for certain that we were in some VR simulation and materialism was false), and rightly so. But there are things that annoy me too, but it doesn't help when people have disagreements to just fight each other when there is a disconnect. If it turned out that we could know if we were brains in vats I would agree with you that our everyday lives wouldn't change. AND we would still be doing science and making more technology and learning more about how our experience behaves. I just wouldn't go arround making ontological claims that can't, and never have been be justified by science. You think that science shows that our experience is phsyical, at least to such a high degree of probablity that it would be foolish to entertain other "possiblities." I'm saying that your mistaken for the reasons given. But see, I'm a big proponent of science. I don't know why you keep lumping me in with these other folks. The BIV sort of argument is important to my interests only because it uncovers certain assumptions that often go unnoticed, and that are mistaken. It interests me for two reasons. First I think we should recognise the Truth, whatever it is always, which makes me first and foremost, a skeptic. Second, I think that there is a solution to the problem over ontology, and what BIV sort of arguments do is takes us a step closer to solving it once we acknoledge what it is showing us. That doesn't make me scientifically ignorant. On the contrary, it demonstrates my appriciation for science, and acknowledging truthfully what it can and cannot do without being dogmatic. If you disagree about scientific epistemology, cool, I'm open to rational discussion. That's anything but dogmatic.

Well, if I understand your correctly here, I agree with it insofar as there is no more certainty in the idea that there exists a physical world, than there is in the idea that there isn't one. That's what I have been saying. What I am not sure you see are the implications of what that statement means. I don't see what your saying at all here. You didn't provide an inference, but what I think you might be trying to get at is falacious. If you could show the inference I could adress it. Well then you should distain materialism. The irony here is that the very sort of reasoning that is required logically, to justify that position, is the very same sort of reasoning you "distain."

If your sober, then act like it. And if your going to resort to namecalling it would help if you actually represented my postion correctly, don't you think? I am not saying anything that, your saying that I'm saying that. Again, your misrepresenting my position. If you want to call me names, fine, have fun, but at least take the time to get the position your saying is silly correct instead of putting up straw men. Edit: If you don't want to talk metaphysical than you shouldn't use metaphysical terms like *materialism," in that metaphysical sense when your talking about neuroscience or science generally.

dude, come back and respond to this shit when your not hammered. evidently not drunk people lol!

sure it does. My statement means that I didn't assume that materialism as a rational theory of reality is metaphysical in terms of how to catagorise it. Here by "assume" I was talking about as in taking information to be true without suficent reason to endorse it. That's why I said "I gave reasons why it is," meaning, that I gave reasons already, in prior posts, as to why materialism is to be classified as a metaphysical concept, specifically an ontological one, given that it is a theory of being. I say "metaphysical here also, and was in context to how PD was using it as well, to mean that which is opposed to what we can experience with our five senses. Even materialists will tell you, the world we experience is a representation of the "real" world they claim exists. That is, we experience a virtual image of the world, not the world directly. This is a form of representationalism. With that in mind, the last sentence is that if we are going to accept materialism as true, then it needs to be justified with "metaphysical" arguments. Here "metaphysical" is the branch of philosophy that deals with inquiry into reality. That study is not limited by the constraints of the scientific method, although it is obviously limited by logic. As I give reasons for above, science can't demonstrate that the world we experience is physical, hence if we are to believe that it is, the reason, will have to come from somewhere other than science.

Someone playing blanka. Hey, you know it annoys me when I see them pick Dan. But I think there are really people who don't know that Dan is a joke character to poke fun of SNK and try to actually take the character seriously, like when they ask for seriosu buffs to him. wtf lol

I never assumed it was metaphysical, I have given reasons for why it is. Materialism is a metaphysical concept and it needs metaphysical justification if we are going to believe it to be true. Science can never prove it to be true, even in principle. I have given reasons for this. Not sure I understand the last part of your sentence "not just a concept." What do you mean? Edit: rather can you elaborate more on what you mean by that?

Right, I get that. I'm making the point, that talking about the "physical" is actually talking metaphysically. You might not think it appears that way, but appearances can be deceiving.

Ok, I think I see your thought process now. One preliminary remark about the simulation argument before I respond to what you said. It's not that we might be in a simulation or the "real" world, because there could be other possibilities. In other words, that's not the only choice. But I harp on the simulation because its a simple example given our techno-friendly culture. Really the argument has to do with ontology, phenomenology and empirical epistemology, but talking about it in that way or more technical and not always necessary. With that said, To try to restate what your getting at; it is often assumed by some when they hear that sort of argument that we could be in a simulation, or in your words "its possible" that we might be in one, that there is no positive reason (well some physicists are starting to theories about it but without getting into that) for why should we take it seriously and not just assume the materialist hypothesis. That sounds to me basically what you’re saying in response. My retort is that the implications of the argument don't allow for you to grant that there is any good reason whatsoever to think the world is a simulation, material, or any of the other choices out there in principle. It’s an argument from skepticism about those sorts of possibilities. In other words, what it does is simply dethrone any objective epistemic foothold anyone thought they might have of the world, and brings you right back to the point of experience, or, what we might call the phenomenological. Anything beyond that, is not a task for science, because science cannot in principle ever answer that question (although it can help chip down some specific possibilities, at best). It's really a metaphysical problem, and a metaphysical problem only. What it does is shift the burden of proof not only onto the simulation proponent, but onto the would-be materialist also, and whoever else wants to propose this or that theory. This is what I think happens in a crude sort of way. We have an experience, which is just that, an experience in which subject and object are part of the same reality we call experience; this is the phenomenal. Sometimes we take elements of our experience like objects that we percieve and we imagine them in our mind (which is still yet another first person experience) and we asign a conception of reality as one that is outside of anything we experience, and funidmentally diferent in some way. That's how you get materialism, representationalism, redictionism, etc. Then we are faced with the insurmountable chalenge of trying to reconcile the two. It's just like with dualism, it doesn't work. The fatal error is in us taking the image we have in your heads of how we think world is really, for how the world is really, when we don't even have not one shred of proof is there be such a thing. At best its a conceptual tool to help us get along. But the funny thing is, you can make the same sort of predicts using models that are anti-materialistic but function the same (there is your pragmatism). in other words, materialism is actually all in your head, and not in your perception. The world you experience, is just an experience, primarilly. Materialism isn't a given nore does any pragmatic utility it might have at some historical time lend any support to its validity.

Yeah i didn't even know that dude was involved untill I was in the theater. But I liked it so it didn't matter anyway.

Ok, I think I can roll with this. Actually, things like phenomenology aren't centuries old. They aren't even a century old. and there are lots of developments in philosophy that you just don't see. For instance there are very serious people doing metaphysics in analytic circles, about all sorts of things like causation, wholes vs. parts, paradoxes, etc. But I don't see why age has any sort of barring on truth or logic. Math, for instance, has been around for a long time and while our knowledge of it has grown, there are still things that are true through and through. And as for the hard problem,where did I assume anything? I'm working off of the basic concepts assumed by the problem to begin with. I'm just pointing out that it leads to an absurdity, which means the assumptions of the problem itself are wrong. That's the opposite of what your saying I'm saying. When you say its a trick, you sound like a line right out of Consciousness explained or perhaps Dennitte's TED talk. What your talking about is a Dennitian take on consciousness, which is philosophical, and it surely isn't the only one. Dennitte is a philosopher of science, but the thing about him is that he disregards experience altogather. He is free to make that case, but he can't make it with science. That's a philosophical argument. and I know this cor certain because its simply a consequence of the meanings fo the words involved here. I'm saying science in the strict sense doesn't opporate on that assumption (materialism). It doesn't need it, and in fact, that "assumption" isn't even scientific, its philosophical. As far as pragmatic value goes, you can make all the sorts predictions with a model, but don't confuse the predictive value of concepts for ontological reality. It's not the same, and we don't need ontology to do science, hence we don't need materialism as thought of being an ontological reality. Therefore materialism, as an ontological reality, literally isn't usefull at all scientfically, although it might seem that way. The concept has historically proven usefull technologically, but that says nothing about its ontological validity. I disgaree. There is no basis for it at all. You can't emperically verify it and you can't falsify it. That exhausts all the criteria for a scientific endevor. Sure, but science isn't telling us anything ontologically relevant about reality, unless someone's specific ontology makes emperical prediction. Things could be falsified in that case, but ontology is to general for that, and materialism is on that level of generality. I'm confused here as to why you would say that the implications of the simulation argument or one like it would mean that life would lose any meaning or purpose. I'm not syaing that at all. This whole buisness about pragmatism as opposed to a classical idea of truth really only arises when you take certain philosophical assumptions, something someone like Rorty would hardly object too. The part where you mention "rules that are to our advantage" is exactly what I am getting at. But don't confuse that which is usefull and advantagous with an accurate picture of reality "out there" above and beyond the phenomenological. That is where the disconect is. Materialism, in any of its flavors, commits that falacy.

TM look https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LqKDo-JtKo

Maybe we are speaking past each other to some extent, due to some ambiguity on this issue, or maybe I just don't understand what you mean here. I thought I gave reasons for why we do know the limits of the scientific method and why we do understand that question. Ok. Well that is because we cannot know what something is appart from what it is like. Ontology is necssarily as a starting point, phenomenological. The question is, is can we know that there are things appart from what they are like? If we can or cannot, we wont be able to answer that with science, ever. Bogus because they are inherently illogical, they weren't systematic or because they lacked predictive value? What is your standard of judgement here, utility or social convention, or both or something else? So then ontology is irrelevant to scientific inquiry. But then any ontologies like materialism and the rest cannot have any scientific basis. Also that means that science cannot, ever, in principle, solve the hard problem of consciousness given that it rests on ontological assumptions. Also, we are only "slaves" to pragmatism if we exclusively except scientific methodology as being the only way to obtain ALL forms of knowledge. There is no reason to do that and even trying to make such an assertion is inhernetly contradictory due to the logical, mathamatical and epistemological assumptions assumed in the scientific method itself. I think you make a false dicotomy between science on the one hand, and things like alchemy and sosory or w/e.

Ok, a some poeple I know told me the same shit. But were talking about if you liked a movie or not. Really its just conversational, assuming people are honest and rational. Some of the criticisms of the movie are just str8 up rediculous, where as others aren't. I liked it and gave some reasons.

But that's just an assertion. On what basis is it that we don't know those limits? Didn't I gave you an idea of where those limits could be found, namely in "the categorical limitations assumed in the method?" I really think you might be confusing the limits of ascertaining knowledge within the scope of the scientific method with the limits of the method itself. What sets the many worlds hypothesis as a scientific notion is if it can be investigated empirically to have predictive value. If it cannot, it is not science. That's a limit of the method. The limit is in the very criteria used in the method. it's just like I said before with the analogy of an investigator. Sounds to me like your just begging the question, but maybe I'm mistaken. Care to elaborate on what credentials would that be? Social acceptance perhaps? That's culturally relative and historically contextual, hence contingent. Pragmatic value maybe? Well I would say that it does have practical value. Thanks to science I can turn my car on. It's useful, but so are allot of things. It is useful I would add because it has predictive value. But if we were really in some VR simulation it would have the same predictive value and it would be indistinguishable from a real world, whatever that would mean. At the end of the day science is useful in predicting outcomes with conceptual tools we call theories. I'm just saying lets be truthful about the limits it has. You disagree I'm sure, but on what basis?

Yeah, I'm with you that we shouldn't jump the gun. The way I look at it myself is, like, for exmaple, "where is your inference?" So many times people make these wild leaps that aren't logical. Definitely, we should strip away any assumptions or unnecessary postulates. I also agree it must proceed systematically according to its method, and this process can be slow going, but it is a necessary evil, if you will. However, what kind of method is it and what sorts of conclusions is it capable of drawing categorically in principle? See, there is the rub. I agree with you on the bit about time and surely being open to the unknown, but I think you confuse the fact of the "unknown" in the domain within our scientific knowledge to mean that the scientific method has no epistemological limits. If I remember I thought your response is something to the effect of, "how do we know we can't find a scientific solution to such and such a problem." My answer here is that the limits of science are not set by the fact of our scientific knowledge being incomplete, but by the catagorical limitations assumed by the method from the get-go. Its like if I was an investigator and I am only limited to looking at a certain brand of evidence and only allowed to use certain sorts of methods, then there may be information that may be beyond my methods of investigation. See, just like you said that we shouldn't take theories that seem to patch unknowns at the local level of explanation, I am saying we shouldn't take methods as a whole, as patching epistemological unknowns at the meta-level of method itself. That's why I don't think we will ever have a solution to the hard problem of consciousness that could ever be considered "scientific" and ultimately why all ontological disputes will never be addressed by science either. As far as consciousness goes, science will never be phenomenology, and phenomenology will never be science. Likewise for ontology or metaphysics generally. One of the biggest proof of this is that we really can do science without any talk of ontology in any real sense. Not to beat a dead horse or anything, but suppose we really do live in some sort of virtual reality simulation as some people think (I'm not one of them btw), then we could still do science just the same exact way we are doing now and it would make no diference. That's because the kind of knowledge the method is getting us to is about regularities that we can predict as part of a logical framework (the thoeries themselves which are nothing but tools for predictive value), and nothing more. I know it might sound like I'm trying to bash science, but believe me I'm not. I just think its important to recognise the limits of the method.

Nah I never been on PC games. But I know what you mean now,. I think your right and it does contribute to the pandemonium that is ACV's visual experience, but the AC's are still hard to distinguish when they are standing still or at a distance, as compared to older AC games. It's kind of like in old cartoons how you knew if something was going to move cause it was a different texture from the painted background.

TM, what is this about the framerate; can you elaborate? Nob, Yeah man, lol the new UNAC option. But you know, in all honestly, the AI will such I'm sure, no matter how well you program it, but its better than being stuck as an opporator. At least you can program it to be less dumb or stand in one location and just defend or something and rely on it to complete simple tasks while you quickly opporate. Cause you know no one likes having to be an opporator and now it can be a full 5v5.