exogen

what are the side effects of using DMT? all drugs have side effects that I know of so this would not surprise me. as fun as I'm sure it is I would use it at least in moderation.

First some key terms defined. Realism: that objects of sense experience exist independently of their being perceived. Idealism: that objects of sense experience exist only when perceived. Monism: that reality consists of an unchanging whole in which change is mere illusion. Dualism: that there exists two kinds of substances, mind and matter. Pluralism: that there exists a plurality of substances. Materialism a kind of monism. The theory that physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena. Physicalism: the doctrine that all phenomena can be described in terms of space and time and that all meaningful statements are either analytic, as in logic and mathematics, or can be reduced to empirically verifiable assertions Note: all of the above terms of metaphysical positions. Even the realist counts as a metaphysical position and this will become clear why below. Metaphysics: The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute. Empirical: knowledge derived from the 5 senses. Pragmatism: that the truth and meaning of statements is measured in terms of its practical application. Phenomenology: the movement founded by Husserl that concentrates on the detailed description of conscious experience, without recourse to explanation, metaphysical assumptions, and traditional philosophical questions Qualia: A quality or property of conscious experience, such as the redness of a flower, considered independently from things having the property The brain in a vat argument, which is a restatement of an argument by Rene Descartes about the possibly of an evil genius who is deceiving one’s beliefs, is an argument for skepticism about the existence of the world external to ones senses. While this does not establish a philosophical position but only serves to deconstruct the knowledge base for accepting a number of philosophical positions, what it does do is serve to unravel some profound and important assumptions, clarifications and distinctions, which can be used to advance our own philosophical understanding. I will be attacking, via this line of thought, the reason for the need to hold a realist position. The brain in a vat argument can be stated a number of ways. The main way is that for all you know you could be a brain in a vat with your nervous system hooked up to a computer that is feeding you false sensory data so that the world you perceive is nothing but a virtual simulation. Another way to talk about it is, for all you know, you could be in the matrix or in a dream level from the movie inception. Notice however that all of those images presuppose the existence of a world exterior to one’s own mind but that hypothetically the one you experience isn’t it. I will explain later that this is not a necessary presupposition to hold that it does exist. The BIV argument is predicated on the notion that our sense data can be questioned. But why is this? Our sense experience (the five senses) is not only how we know about the world we perceive but the very domain for which for us at least, it exists. We have never experienced the world apart from the 5 senses. The supposition that it exists beyond the senses is not open to direct sense verification, or falsification for that matter, because we have nothing to measure it against. Furthermore we could never verify or falsify the external world with our senses because that would involve supplying evidence for the justification of sense data with sense data itself, which is circular reasoning and therefore invalid. If ALL our experience of the world comes from our 5 senses and if there is no verification of the accuracy of that sense data, let alone the truth of those experiences being construed a certain way philosophically then it is logical to be skeptical of the world existing beyond our mere experience of it. Now it is sometimes objected that the idea of us being in some computer simulation, or the world not being “real”, something more than our experience, is highly improbable and therefore silly. But on what basis does this objection stand? The world of the 5 senses is known solely through the 5 senses. If the senses as a whole are called into question then so is everything in it, including all of the science and other information gathered from it. As strange as it is, that is the logical conclusion. Thus the argument is not about a degree of certainty but more of a 50/50% chance of the world existing as we think it does, or not. Another objection to BIV as advanced by Hillary Putnam is that the meaning of our words represents externally existing objects. This view is called externalism. However the objection fails when one clarifies the fact that there is a difference between the experience of the world and the world as it actually exists to begin with. Our words can refer to the objects of our sense experience in a phenomenological way without need of them existing independent of my experience. In fact the whole philosophy of phenomenology demonstrates we are not dependant on externalistic realism. A similar objection is that although the skepticism might be warranted it is not practical to live or think this way. But this objection does not hold because if somehow we knew that we really were just brains in vats, and therefore all our physics and such was nothing but virtual simulated physics, we would still have use for it. We would still be able to use physics to build our cars and such because we would be using the physics of the simulation. In other words our statements about perceived objects do not need to mean that they literally exist in the sense the realist wants just for them to be meaningful because they could be purely pragmatic or as we shall see, there are alternative interpretations. This brings to light a crucial bit of information. It points out that our scientific theories can function irrespective of our philosophical positions on the nature of the existence of the world of our sense data. We can just as easily do science with a simulated world or an “actual” one and practically speaking it would make no difference to us. In other words science as a pragmatic and methodological enterprise is not dependant on the metaphysical notion of realism, illustrating that neither realism nor anti-realism is a necessary scientific presupposition. Rather they are alternative philosophical interpretations of scientific data and conceptual models for scientific theories. We can even not include the concept of realism as part of the interpretation of a scientific theory and it would have no practical barring because the practical consequences of a scientific theory can be utilized independently in experiment, in terms of predictive and functional value, apart from the interpretive considerations off the data. Simply put, it doesn’t matter whether or not we think the world really does exist when we are not perceiving it or if this is just some simulation for the theory of gravity to have predictive value, which shows that these concepts and the way we think about the world of our 5 senses is a separate matter then a scientific investigation of that same empirical phenomena. This is exactly why the mathematics of a scientific theory can be used to yield experimental predictions of cohere observational data are totally separate from the interpretation(s) of those equations. Realism is a purely metaphysical theory and really has no need to be included in scientific investigation beyond its practical significance, which is not dependant on that concept and which can be substituted for alternative positions. Yet another objection to the BIV argument is that although we could be part of this whole grand simulation there must be SOME external world “out there” even if we can never get to it, verify or falsify that it exists. This is just an assumption. The world we call “the external world” is perceived with our five senses. Our 5 senses have no way of being verified or falsified. Therefore we cannot verify or falsify the existence of the external world. Therefore the external world cannot be regarded as “external” but must be understood as simply the world of our 5 senses or the world of our empirical experience. The question then becomes must we think about the world of our 5 senses as existing on its own? The BIV argument is interesting because it can take a position like realism and use it to cast doubt on itself. This is because of the underlying problem of verifiability and falsefiablity of empirical phenomenon and why to try to do so using empirical data is circular reasoning. There indeed are alternative positions to philosophical realism. Idealism for example or pragmatism which does not weigh-in either way because it is only interested in practical utility provides alternatives. Another position is the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which says that the world, when not observed is in a state of superposition, which is the simultaneous state of all potential states until an observation occurs which collapses the wave function into a definitive value. These and other ideas like them are examples of why we don’t need the realist way of looking at things to go about our day, do science and make progress or speak about the objects of our senses. Now with all that in mind it should be noted at any attempt to get out of the brain in the vat argument or substantiate the realist position using empirical data commits the fallacy of circular reasoning and is therefore invalid, as was pointed out above. What that demonstrates is that realism or any one of the other alternative interpretations are metaphysical in kind and therefore must be dealt with on the level of metaphysical analysis and argumentation.

Simply put, and this is a demonstrable fact, Creationism AND intelligent Design are not scientific theories. for them to qualify as a scientific theory they need to make empirical predictions that can then be tested via observation within the context of experiment, done validly, that can be repeated and falsified. Creationism/ID does neither. Creationism can always rework the Data to suite the coherence of the theory to avoid contradiction. an example would be if one shows some bit of evidence that supports an evolutionary view in biology which is then reinterpreted by the creationist by saying "god just made it that way". the creationist can always say that god made it this way or that. in other words creationism is unfalsifiable because it does not specify any empirical data that is predicted to be observed under experimental conditions or in the field. ID is a bit better then creationism insofar as the notion advanced by Micheal Behe of "irreducible complexity" which is the notion that in order for a life system to evolve it must have design pathways that would allow the transition from one micro-state to the next. in other words Irreducible complexity is the idea that life cannot have evolved because if you take out one part of a given biological artifact then the function no longer works much in the same way a mouse trap will no longer work if you take out the spring to catch mice. this notion however has of IC has been refuted on two counts. 1. design pathways (the trajectory of evolutionary changes made by an organism (note the phenotypical and genotypical evolution) through time in a population can be shown to exist via a whole host of evidence be it genetic, archeological, computer models or simply to demonstrate the principle is wrong by experiment, all of which have been done numerous times if one simply looks. 2. The notion of ID it self is based on a falcy that the function of a design, while it might be hindered by removing parts, it does not change the fact that a diferent function can emerge as a result. this was pointed out even in a cort case on evolution and ID in the schools where one famous biologist showed how although you could remove a mouse trap's spring and therefore it's function no longer was served to atch mice, it still none the less, could make a creat tie clip. One redeeming quality of ID however is that the the idea of ID in point 1, of design pathways needing to be illustrated to show that an organism has evolved through a successive set of changes is a create way to falsify evolution, which only supports the theory even more. so ironically ID only helps the case for evolution in it's effort to knock it down.

I want to see AC5 mechanics as follows. powerfull boost that moves you quick like in first generation games (Ac1). no QB, unless it is very weak, does not increase speed and only effective when used for twitch dodging and not movement. OB should have a strong pop like SL and not be lame like AC4 or overpowered like ACFA. turning should be balanced and there should be no QT. load caps should make sense (the direction whey were going in, in FA regs 1.3 and on). lock boxes need to return. forward thrust should be stronger then side or back thrust, but not completely dominant. ground boosting should be unlimited or slow draining. air boost should be high powered (again like Ac1) but drain conciderably (also like in Ac1). cover needs to be returned (already confirmed). Gens should be reduced to only a few that work according to purpose and are not tiered (keep it simple). I think if they made a game like that it would have the fast pace gameplay that people enjoy while also offering a tacticlly balanced and diverse strategies and styles all at the same time. It would merge the best of both words (old and new schools) in a easy to learn framework.